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Abstract—Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) has been 
generally regarded as an ideal network model for group 
communications because of its specialty of instant 
establishment. However, the security of MANET is still a 
challenge issue. Although there are some existing security 
schemes such as ARAN (Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc 
Networks) protocol that makes use of cryptographic 
certificate to provide end-to-end authentication during 
routing phases, the overhead of security computation is still 
a serious hurdle for real application. In this paper, we 
propose a comparatively efficient scheme to perform ARAN 
protocol, based on AODV, by using one-time signature in 
place of conventional signature, aiming at achieving the 
same level of security but improved efficiency. We also 
provide two approaches to handle the authentication of 
gratuitous route reply using delegation token and transitive 
signature schemes. 
Index Terms—MANET, Routing, AODV, Digital Signature, 
One-time signature, Transitive signature. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET) are a specific 
type of network. Just as its name implies, it is formed by 
mobile nodes, such as laptops and PDAs. The 
construction of the networks is generally impromptu, 
therefore, networks can be formed whenever required and 
topology is changing from time to time. Ideally, any 
nodes satisfy general entering conditions will be accepted 
as a legitimate member of the network. These properties 
make MANET very suitable for group communications, 
in which, a number of people get together, forming a 
network to share documents and exchange conversations. 
On the other hand, the wide-open environment makes 
this network super vulnerable to inside and outside 
attacks [1Error! Reference source not found.]. 
Especially in the case of routing [2], since the absence of 
central control, it is extremely difficult to prevent nodes 
from behaving improperly. Although there exist a large 
number of MANET routing protocols [3,4,5, 8,11], most 
of them were designed without any security 
considerations (generally it is assumed that all nodes are 
friendly). Besides, the resource constraints (both 
computation and bandwidth) of MANET put up great 
difficulties over the deployment of security. Two widely 
known reactive routing protocols are AODV (Ad hoc On-
Demand Distance Vector Routing) [8] and DSR 
(Dynamic Source Routing) [5], which are both very 
efficient but are subject to a variety of attacks. 
To reinforce the security of routing, ARAN [11] makes 
use of cryptographic techniques to offer security in an 
open-manage environment. Since the security is based on 
public key cryptography, the efficiency of ARAN is 
under suspicion. In this paper, we pursue the advantages 
of one-time signature, which is more efficient in signing 
and verification, to replace conventional digital signature 
in protecting routing packets, though, at the same time, 
maintaining the same level authentication. 
In our previous work [12], we made use of delegation 
token to enable the authentication of the gratuitous reply 
in route discovery. In this paper, we introduce another 
approach by using transitive signature scheme introduced 
by Micali and Rivest [6]. 
The rest of the paper is organized as below. Section 2 
briefly introduces the AODV routing protocol and ARAN 
routing scheme. Section 3 describes the HORS one-time 
signature scheme and its key generation process. Section 
4 explains our scheme used to secure AODV, called 
authenticated AODV. In section 5, we introduce two 
approaches to be used to authenticate gratuitous route 
reply. Section 6 discusses the security of our proposal. 
The last section concludes the paper. 
II.  BACKGROUNDS 
In this section, we introduce the basics of the AODV 
routing protocol and the ARAN authentication scheme. 
A.  AODV Routing 
AODV is a simple and efficient on-demand ad hoc 
routing protocol. Basically, it uses RREQ (route request), 
RREP (route reply) and RRER (routsue error) messages 
to accomplish route discovery and maintenance 
JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 1, NO. 1, MAY 2006 47
© 2006 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
operations. It also utilizes sequence numbers to prevent 
routing loops. Routing decision making is based on 
sequence numbers and routes maintained in each node’s 
routing table. 
The routing operations of AODV generally consist of 
two phases: route discovery and route maintenance. 
Route discovery is performed through broadcasting 
RREQ message. Whenever a node needs to send data 
packets to a destination, it first checks if it has an existing 
route in the routing table. If not, the source node will 
initiate a RREQ and broadcast this request to all the 
neighbours. Then neighbouring nodes will update their 
routing table according to the received message. 
When RREQ reaches the destination, a RREP will be 
generated by the destination node as a response to RREQ. 
The RREP will be transmitted back to the originator of 
RREQ in order to inform the route. If an intermediate 
node has an active route towards destination, it can reply 
the RREQ with a RREP, which is called Gratuitous Route 
Reply. The intermediate node will also send an RREP to 
destination node. The RREP will be sent in reverse route 
of RREQ if a bidirectional link exists. 
 Route maintenance is performed with two additional 
messages: Hello and RRER messages. Each node 
broadcast Hello messages periodically to inform 
neighbours about its connectivity. The receiving of Hello 
message proves that there is an active route towards the 
originator. Each forwarding node should keep track of its 
continued connectivity to its active next hops. If a link to 
the next hop cannot be detected during a period of time-
out, a RRER message will be broadcasted to inform the 
loss of connectivity. On receiving this RRER, usually a 
local repair will be performed just for maintenance. The 
expired route will be deleted after the confirmation of its 
unavailability. 
From the security point of view, AODV requires at 
least two security attributes: sender authentication at each 
receiving node and routing message integrity. Message 
integrity is of the most concern in AODV routing. In 
route request broadcasting phase, each node has to check 
the originator sequence number in the RREQ packet with 
the one recorded in its routing table, and updates its 
routing table to the newest one; in route reply phase, 
instead of checking originator sequence number, each 
node check the destination sequence number and keeps it 
up-to-date. Any exploits of changing sequence number 
will result in routing loops.  
Besides message alteration, spoofing is also a serious 
attack. A node forward RREP might claim itself to be 
someone else, misleading the receiving nodes falsely 
recording the fake identity as the next hop towards 
destination. This is another way of disrupting topology by 
creating route loops. 
B.  ARAN 
ARAN was proposed by Sanzgiri et al in 2002, 
targeting to combat attacks including unauthorized 
participation, spoofed route signaling, alteration of 
routing messages, replay attacks, etc. Similar to other 
secure routing protocols, ARAN is also a security adds-
on over on-demand routing protocols. It provides 
authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation as 
part of minimal security policy for ad hoc environment. 
ARAN stands for Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc 
Networks. It is motivated to detect and protect against 
malicious actions by third parties and peers in an ad hoc 
environment. ARAN is a security scheme, which can be 
applied to any on-demand routing protocols. It takes the 
advantages of PKI based digital signature scheme to 
provide security features including authentication, 
message integrity and non-repudiation.  
ARAN consists of three stages: a preliminary 
certification process, a mandatory end-to-end 
authentication stage and an optional stage providing 
secure shortest path.  To deploy these three stages, 
ARAN requires the use of a trusted certificate server T 
and public key cryptography. Each node, before entering 
the network, must request a certificate from T, and will 
receive exactly one certificate after securely 
authenticating their identities to T.  
Routing operations of ARAN are performed using 
three data structures: route discovery packet (RDP), reply 
packet (REP), and error packet (ERR). Each of them 
contains necessary routing information as well as the 
public key certificate. When a node wants to initiate a 
route discovery, it creates a signed RDP and broadcasts it 
to the next hop. The next hop node verifies the 
originator's signature. If it is authentic, it adds its own 
certificate and signs the whole packet again. The 
following hop node performs the same operation, 
however, after the verification of all the signatures of the 
received RDP it replaces previous hop node's signature 
with its own. Operations repeated until the packet reaches 
the target. 
When the target node receives this RDP, it replies with 
a REP. This packet is in the same format of RDP, 
containing destination's signature and certificate. Each 
forwarding node verifies the signature, removes previous 
hop node's signature, and then adds its own outside the 
packet. If this route reply reaches the originator, it is 
guaranteed that the route found is authentic. 
The authentication scheme provided by ARAN defends 
against exploits using modification, fabrication and 
impersonation. However, the use of public key 
cryptography is very costly. The computational overhead 
caused by signature generation and verification brings 
tremendous burden for mobile nodes. A group of 
malicious nodes may exploit this vulnerability to launch a 
deny-of-service attack by simply broadcasting large 
number of RDP packets. The receiving nodes have to 
exhaust their computational resources to verify the 
signature and then generate new ones. In addition, the 
extra bandwidth used to transmitting certificate is also 
another burden. 
III. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we introduce the one-time signature 
scheme to be used in the construction of our 
authentication scheme. 
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Figure 1. Secret key components hash chain. 
A. HORS 
As we observed, since ARAN use public key 
cryptography to protect routing process, the time delay of 
signature generation and verification is significant. In 
general, significant time delay at each hop causes 
unacceptable route acquisition latency. Thus, we are 
looking for some digital signature schemes that maintain 
all the traits of conventional DSS, but are efficient 
enough in signature generation and verification.  
The very first one-time signature scheme was 
introduced by Lamport in 1979 [7], to sign just 1 bit 
information. In 2002, Reyzin et al [10] proposed an one-
time signature scheme, which is both efficient in signing 
and verification, and generating short signatures. This 
resulting scheme is called HORS, which stands for Hash 
to Obtain Random Subset. The major operation in 
signature generation is using a hashed message to obtain 
a random subset to form the signature. 
HORS stands for Hash to Obtain Random Subset. It 
was proposed by Reyzin et al [10] in 2002, motivated to 
provide an efficient signing algorithm. HORS consists of 
three algorithms: key generation, signing and verification. 
● HORS Key Generation 
On constructing this scheme, several security 
parameters are predefined. To sign b-bit messages, we 
firstly pick t and k such that 
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
k
t ≥ 2b and then choose a 
security parameter l, and a one-way hash function f that 
operates on l-bit strings. To generate public key, 
randomly generate l-bit string (s1, s2, …, st). Let vi = f(si) 
for 1≤ i≤ t. The resulting public key is PK = (k, v1, v2, …, 
vt), private key is SK = (k, s1, s2, …, st). 
● HORS Signature Generation 
To sign a message m, with secret key SK = (k, s1, s2, …, 
st), firstly let h = hash(m); then split h into k substrings h1, 
h2,…, hk, of length log2t bits each; finally, interpret each 
hj as an integer ij for 1≤ j≤ k. The resulting signature is σ 
= (si1, si2, …, sik).  
● HORS Signature Verification 
The verification is the same as the signature generation. 
Suppose the verifier has the message m, signature σ = 
(s’i1, s’i2, …, s’ik), and public key PK = (k, v1, v2, …, vt). 
Firstly, let h = hash(m); then split h into k substrings h1, 
h2,…, hk, of length log2t bits each and interpret each hj as 
an integer ij for 1≤ j≤ k. If for each j, 1≤ j≤ k, f(s’j) == 
vij, accept the signature; otherwise, reject the signature.  
In HORS, the public key component can be used 
multiple times. Signature generation requires only one 
call to hash function. Verification requires k calls to hash 
function. One impressive advantage of HORS is the 
shorter signature size. For their most efficient 
construction, the signature size can be reduced to 20480 
bits. 
B.  One-Time Key Generation for Routing 
Here, we describe the HORS one-time key generation 
process.  
● Notations: 
h(), h, hi() – one way function 
SignKn  – conventional digital 
signature generated by node n 
<>Kn-1 – one-time signature generated 
by node n 
 
 
● Key Chain generation: 
Suppose that the decision has been made regarding 
security parameters l, k and t according to message length 
b. 
1. Each node chooses t secret key components xj 
(j=1,…,t) at random.  
2. Each node creates a n hash chain of length t 
(see Figure 1): 
3. Public key components are obtained through a 
one-way function h, namely vi = h(xi). We 
assume that h is a hash function for simplicity. 
4. Public key components are disclosed 
periodically.  
Generating a set of one-time keys to sign routing 
messages has been discussed by Zhang in 1998 [15]. Two 
schemes called chained one-time signature scheme 
(COSP) and independent one-time signature scheme 
(IOSP) were proposed. These two schemes activate us to 
generate our novel scheme. 
IV. AUTHENTICATED AODV ROUTING PROTOCOL 
Based on the one-time signature scheme described 
above, we propose a security adds-on for AODV, which 
containing ARAN’s authenticated routing features. This 
proposed protocol will provide following security 
properties: 
1. The target node can authenticate the originator; 
2. Each receiving node can authenticate its 
previous hop from which the routing message 
coming; 
3. Each intermediate node can authenticate the 
sender for updating its routing table entry; 
4. The hop count value is protected using hash 
chain. It cannot be reduced by a malicious node, 
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  N:     Choose secret key component SK  
    Construct hash chain  
    The first public key component PK1 is the Anchor
Figure 2.  Initial key distribution and authentication (in System Setup)
 
S A B C D
S:   So = SignS<RREQ, top hash, hop count> 
S *:  So, CertS 
A:   hop count = 1 
A *:  So, <h(So)>KA-1, CertS 
B:   hop count = 2 
B *: So, <h2(So)>KB-1, CertS 
RREQ: 
C:   hop count = 3 
C *: So, < h3(So)>KC-1, CertS 
D:    check h(MAX_HOP_COUNT – HOP COUNT) (So ) = top hash 
   Sd = SignS<RREP, top hash, hop count> 
D C: Sd , CertD 
RREP: 
C B: Sd, <h(Sd)>KC-1, CertD 
B A: Sd, < h(Sd)>KB-1, CertD 
A S: Sd, < h(Sd)>KA-1, CertD 
Figure 3. Route Request and Route Reply 
but could be increased more than one or retained 
unchanged, as in SAODV [14]. 
To achieve security features listed above, we firstly 
assume the existence of an offline CA, which issues 
certificate for each node when entering the network. Thus, 
each node possesses a public key and private key pair. 
The conventional digital signature will still be used to 
provide sender authentication, whereas the one-time 
signature will offer end-to-end authentication. 
A.  Public Key Handling 
The public key in our proposed protocol is 
disseminated in two different ways. One aims at 
providing keys for authentication among neighbors. 
Another one tries to enable sender authentication during 
message transmission. 
End-to-end authentication is achieved through 
neighbor authentication. Each node will generate a set of 
one-time keys as described in section 3.1. The one-time 
public key components are distributed locally among 
neighbors. Since one-time keys can only be used once or 
limited times, nodes need to update their one-time public 
keys periodically. To guarantee that each neighboring 
node has an authentic copy of node’s public key, the very 
first public key, anchor, is distributed safely during 
system setup. When a node enters the network, it signs its 
anchor and broadcasts to its neighbors, along with its 
certificate. Thus, successive one-time public keys can be 
distributed in a more efficient manner by using Hello 
message, which is broadcasted periodically. The 
verification of updates is straightforward. 
For example, the first secret key SK1 is (k, hn(x1), hn(x2), 
hn(x3), …,hn(xt)). The corresponding public key PK1 is (k, 
hn+1(x1), hn+1(x2), hn+1(x3), …,hn+1(xt)). The second secret 
key SK2 is (k, hn-1(x1), hn-1(x2), hn-1(x3), …,hn-1(xt)), thus the 
corresponding public key PK2 is (k, hn(x1), hn(x2), 
hn(x3), …,hn(xt)), which can be verified by hashing once 
and comparing to PK1. 
On the other hand, sender authentication is achieved 
through conventional digital signature. The sender’s 
public key is contained in its certificate which is obtained 
when entering the network. 
B. System Setup 
This phase is used for initial key distribution (see 
Figure 2). Suppose when a mobile node enters the 
network, it is soon informed about the security 
parameters agreed in this network. It then chooses its 
secret key components and generates a hash chain 
according to section 3.1. Then it performs as follows: 
 C. Route Discovery 
Route Discovery is performed as in Figure 3. When 
the originator (S) initiates a route discovery to a certain 
destination, it simply generates a signature over the 
RREQ, using conventional digital signature.  
Upon the first hop node (A) receives the RREQ, it 
firstly verifies the signature of the originator. If the 
signature is fine, the neighboring node hashes the 
received message So again and generates its own 
signature over it. This time, the signature is generated 
using HORS one-time signature scheme. Then the whole 
message is re-transmitted to second hop. From now on, 
there are two signatures. One is over So, another is over 
the hash of So. 
Once the second hop node (B) receives this double 
signed RREQ, it firstly verifies the pervious hop (A) 
using public key of A (which might receive through Hello 
messages). If the one-time signature is fine, B hashes So 
one more time and creates a signature over the hash to 
replace the signature of A. Then this new message is 
broadcasted to next hop neighbors. Notice that the 
verification of conventional signature could be delayed. 
Only if both conventional signature and one-time 
signature are fine, does B update its routing table entry 
according to RREQ. These operations repeated until 
RREQ reaches the destination. 
When RREQ reaches the destination, the destination 
node performs verifications the same as each intermediate 
node. Then a RREP is generated and signed the same as 
RREQ. Each intermediate node will transmit it back to 
the originator through the reverse route and same 
operations are performed along the route. 
V. HANDLING GRATUITOUS ROUTE REPLY 
In AODV, gratuitous route reply enables an 
intermediate node to reply RREQs which it has an active 
route towards the destination. This feature is optional in 
AODV, though turning on this feature will highly 
enhance the efficiency of routing discovery. However, to 
enable this feature, additional technique is needed. The 
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S A B C D
RREQ: S:   So = <RREQ, hop count, PKS, TokenS>KS
-1  
  TokenS = < S, PKS, rS, tS>KS-1  
S *: So
A: hop count = 1 
A *:  So, h(So), <h(So)>KA-1  
B: hop count = 2 
B *:  So, h2(So), < h2(So)>KB-1 
C: hop count = 3 
C *:  So, h3(So), <h3(So)>KC-1 
RREP: C:   check h(MAX_HOP_COUNT-Hop_Count)( So)=Top_ Hash 
SC = <RREP, Top_ Hash, Hop_Count, PKC, TokenD>KD-1 
  TokenT = < D, PKD, rD, tD>KD-1 
C B: SC  
B A: SC, h2(SC), <h2(SC)>KB-1 
A S: SC, h3(SC), <h3(SC)>KA-1 
Figure 5. Token enabled route Request and Gratuitous Route Reply.
 A B: <A, TokenA> 
TokenA = <A, B, Pra, ra, ta>Ka-1 
Figure 4.  Delegation Token 
conceptual idea is that since we used digital signature to 
protect each routing message at each hop, for an 
intermediate node to reply RREQs instead of the 
destination, the intermediate node should be able to sign 
the RREQ properly on behalf of the destination. 
 A. Delegation Using Token 
To solve this problem, we borrow the idea from proxy 
signature proposed by Varadharajan et al. [14], in which 
delegation is enabled by using a warrant. The warrant 
appears as a delegation token, containing the identities of 
primary signer and proxy signer, the privilege (Pra) given 
to proxy signer, an identifier (ra) used by primary signer, 
and a timestamp (ta). This delegation token is signed by 
the primary signer. 
We simplify above delegation token into three fields 
(See Figure 4): the destination's identity, an identifier ra 
and a timestamp ta. It is possible because the token does 
not need to be designated to certain nodes. Any node that 
has received the token from a target is automatically 
proved to be having an active route towards the target. 
Otherwise, it would not be able to obtain this token. The 
token is signed by the creator using our IOS signature for 
our scheme. 
The token enabled routing process is shown in Figure 
5. If the gratuitous route reply option is turned on, nodes 
broadcasting RREQs must create tokens for gratuitous 
route reply delegation. The whole message including the 
token will be signed again, using the same public key as 
signing the token. Then, the originator broadcast the 
RREQ as usual. 
Upon receiving the RREQ, node processes the 
authentication as normal. Then it checks the timestamp to 
see if the token has expired. If the token is valid, the 
nodes will store the token for future use. 
The originator firstly checks if this RREP was created by 
destination or by intermediate node. If it is a gratuitous 
route reply, the originator checks the timestamp to 
determine if the route is still active. Then the token and 
the RREP will be authenticated as described before. 
B. Delegation Using Transitive Signature Schemes 
References 
In this section, we introduce another approach for 
enabling delegation by using transitive signature scheme.  
Transitive signature scheme was firstly envisioned by 
Mciali and Rivest [6] in 2002. It was originally used to 
dynamically build an authenticated graph, edge by edge. 
The signer, having secret key sk and public key pk, can at 
any time pick a pair i, j of nodes and create a signature of 
{i, j}, thereby adding edge {i, j} to the graph. In addition, 
given a signature of an edge {i, j} and a signature of an 
edge {j, k}, anyone in possession of the public key can 
create a signature of the edge {i, k}.  
 We make use of the transitive signature scheme proposed 
by Micali and Rivest [6] to construct our design.   
 
 Setup 
Each node in the network agrees with the following 
parameters: 
- large prime p and q such that q divides p-1 
- two generates g and h of subgroup Gq of order q
∈Zp* such that the base-g logarithm of h modular 
p is infeasible for others to compute. 
Then each node ni does the followed: 
1. randomly choose two values xi and yi from Zp*; 
2. compute modi ix qα =   and modi iy qβ = ; 
3. compute modi ix yiv g h p= ; 
4. broadcast iα  and iβ  to node’s neighbors. 
5. upon the receipt of  jα  and jβ  from each 
neighbor, node i compute: 
modij i jx x qα = −   
and modij i jy y qβ = −  
6. node i records in its memory the quadruple: 
( , , , )i j ij ijv v α β  
 Sign  
To sign the path between node A and node B, node B 
must have received Aα , Aβ , and Av  from node A. Then 
node B computes the signature as: 
modAB A Bx x qα = −   and 
modAB A By y qβ = −  
Node B publishes the quadruple as the signature: 
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( , , , )A B AB ABv v α β  
 Verify 
Any node can verify the previous signature by 
checking: 
modAB ABA Bv v g h q
α β=  
 Path Composing 
When the next hop node C receives the signature 
between node A and node B, it firstly verifies the validity 
of the signature in order to ensure that node B does have 
an active route towards node A. Then node C can 
generate a transitive signature over the received one so as 
to incorporate itself into the path.  
Given signature ( , , , )A B AB ABv v α β , node C retrieves 
the quadruple  
( , , , )B C BC BCv v α β  
and computes the new transitive signature 
( , , , )A C AC ACv v α β  
as: 
mod
      mod
AC AB BC
A C
q
x x q
α α α= −
= −
    and 
mod
      mod
AC AB BC
A C
q
y y q
β β β= −
= −
 
The signature for the path from node A to node C is: 
( , , , )A C AC ACv v α β  
The use of the transitive signature scheme to enable the 
route aggregation has one big benefit. It enables the 
authentication of both originator and gratuitous replier in 
one signature. In delegation by warrant, the token is 
signed with the routing packet by the gratuitous replier. 
Thus, the authentication of the gratuitous replier has to be 
done by verifying the conventional signature, and the 
token which is signed using conventional signature 
scheme has to be verified at the same cost. By using 
transitive signatures, the originator and replier can be 
authenticated at the same time.  
However, the use of the transitive signature scheme to 
enable gratuitous reply authentication requires the cost of 
exchanging public key quadruples and computing the 
path signatures between neighboring nodes. It is 
considered to be the major drawback of this application.  
VI. DISCUSSION AND IMPROVEMENT 
The most outstanding point of this scheme is the 
efficiency of one-time signature generation and 
verification at each hop. The same as HORS [10], each 
time, key generation requires t evaluation of one-way 
function. The secret key size is lt bits, and the public key 
size is flt bits, where fl is the length of the one-way 
function output on input of length l. The signature is kl 
bits long. There is a tradeoff between t and k, since the 
public key size will be linear in t, and the signature size 
and verification time will be linear in k. 
The security of this scheme stems from the system 
setup phase. In this phase, a conventional digital 
signature is used to guarantee the authenticity of the first 
public key component. This can be achieved through 
using public key certificate issued by an offline CA, 
namely, each node must present a creditable identity 
when entering the network. The signature verification and 
generation may be inefficient, but since this message is 
broadcasted locally, it should be practical for each node. 
The update of public key component is done along 
with Hello message, which is broadcasted periodically. 
Since the public key component comes from a hash chain, 
the verification is straightforward – the previous public 
key component is used to authenticate the new one. The 
trustworthiness of the new public component depends 
totally on the security of one-way hash function and the 
digital signature over anchor. The anchor is used only 
once. It is replaced by newly coming public key 
component after the first Hello message is broadcasted. In 
this way, nodes only need to do one hash to authenticate 
new public key component each time, which is much 
more efficient than hashing repeatedly back to anchor. 
Sender authentication is performed with some 
compromise of efficiency, using conventional DSS. This 
method is much more secure than in SAODV, because in 
SAODV, the originator simply signs on its own public 
key without the support of PKI. Attackers can easily 
forge RREQ and RREP packets during transmission. On 
the other hand, the efficiency can be enhanced to some 
degree through the way that each node verifies 
conventional digital signature after broadcasting routing 
packets. Therefore, these will be no verification delay. 
Only both conventional signature and one-time signature 
is fine, will the routing table entry be updated. 
Double signing over the received message does not 
provide more security than single signature from 
cryptographic point of view. Nevertheless, it provides 
non-repudiation hop-by-hop, which can be sued as an 
evidence for future intrusion detection. This thought 
comes from ARAN. It is considered as impractical 
because the use of conventional signature schemes. If 
there is a technique to produce even shorter signature in 
more efficient manner, this scheme can be extended to 
allow each node to sign on the received messages. 
One significant drawback of one-time signature is that 
it can sign only predefined number of messages, which, 
in our scheme, is limited by the size of hash chain n. We 
generally consider it is not a serious problem, because 
nodes in MANET are mobile devices which are leaving 
and entering the network frequently. Consequently, the 
hash chain will be refreshed. In this sense, we can set n to 
a proper value according to network scale and average 
active time of nodes. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper presented a novel scheme to implement 
ARAN protocol based on AODV routing protocol. 
However, it is more efficient than original ARAN in 
signature generation and verification by using HORS 
one-time signature in place of conventional digital 
signatures. We enable the protections for gratuitous route 
reply feature, under the concept of proxy signature’s 
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delegation by warrant, as well as the route aggregation 
using transitive signature schemes. The warrant here is 
represented as a token, which contains creator’s identity 
and public key, and is signed by the creator.  
The security of our scheme needs to be enforced by 
performing conventional digital signature. With the help 
of asymmetric cryptography or public key certificate, we 
can ensure the authenticity of mobile nodes and the 
secure distribution of initial keys. Hence, the security of 
sub-sequential keys can be guaranteed by one way hash 
chain. 
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